The Assyrian Levies
by
Lt-Col R.S. Stafford D.S.O. M.C. 1933
The Assyrian Levies were a most noteworthy feature of Iraq, and especially of Northern Iraq during the years of the Mandate, and no account of the Assyrians, nor indeed of Iraq itself, would be complete without some account of them.
Every visitor to Baghdad has remarked on the extremely smart appearance of the guards at the houses of the High Commissioner and the Air Officer Commanding. The general appearance of these troops with their slouch hats and red or white hackles was favorably commented upon by all who saw them and their officers from time to time have said that they were as good as any troops in Asia, not excluding the Sikhs and Gurkhas.
The original Levies were not Assyrians at all. No doubt many will be surprised to learn that it was not until 1928 that the Levies became entirely Assyrian. The force subsequently known as the Levies, originated in Muntafiq Horse, a body of Arabs from the Muntafiq province on the lower Euphrates, forty in number, who were enlisted by Major Eadie in 1915. The force expanded rapidly and became known as "Shabanas", a Turkish word meaning a semi-military gendarmerie. As they became more disciplined they rendered excellent service, and during the Arab rebellion of 1920 they displayed, under conditions of the greatest trial, steadfast loyalty to their British officers. At this time practically all the "Shabanas" were Arabs, with a few Kurds in the north.
In 1919 two battalions of Assyrians were formed out of the refugees in Baquba camp. They were, however, quite distinct from the "Shabanas". They were employed in the north and did good work in operations against the Kurds near Amadiyah. They were however disbanded in 1920 to allow them to take part in Agha Petros's enterprise. In 1920 the Assyrians, as has already been related had given proof of their fighting qualities, when the camps at Mindan and Baquba were attacked by the Arab rebels. During this rebellion much of the country was to all intents and purposes out of control. There were a few isolated places where British officers held out and in several instances these officers were murdered by the rebel Arabs. It would not have been surprising therefore if the Assyrian associates of the British had not been similarly dealt with. But in their camps they held out against all attacks - Arabs at Baquba and of Kurds at Mindan - and General Haldane's testimony to the value of their services has already been quoted.
In the year following the rebellion the Cairo Conference was held. This Conference was held in order to decide what Britain was to do with her Arab conquests. Mr. Winston Churchill, who was, at that time, Secretary of State for the Colonies, presided, and there were present all the experts from the old Arab Bureau who had functioned during the war in Cairo and who had been largely instrumental in bringing the Sharifian forces under the Emir Feisal. Of the many decisions taken at this Conference perhaps the most important was that the Emir Feisal, who in the previous year had been ejected from Damascus by the French, should be recommended to the people of Mesopotamia, or Iraq as it was to be called, as their King. It was also decided, that in the interests of economy the British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia should be replaced by local Levies. These were to comprise Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrians and were to be Imperial troops, maintained and paid by the British Treasury. It was, however, not desired that the enlistment of Arabs in the Levies should be continued for long, as otherwise there would be competition with the Iraqi Army which was shortly to be formed.
So in April 1921 came the first attempt to enlist Assyrians and they were far from successful. The Assyrians said that all they wanted was that the British should arrange for them to return to their own homes. Within two or three months however, two hundred had joined largely through the persuasive eloquence of Dr. Wigram, who having for some years before the war served in the Hakkiari Mountains with the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission was well known to them. The Command was given to Brigadier-General Sadleir Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. More Assyrians joined later and the Assyrian Levies as such had their baptism of fire in December 1921 in the operations near Batas and Harir near Rowanduz, which was at that time in the occupation of the Turks. There was not much actual fighting but the cheerful manner in which the Assyrians underwent extremely trying climatic conditions earned the wholehearted praise of their British officers.
In 1922 it was decided to recruit 1,500 more Assyrians. The experiment of having mixed companies of Kurds and Assyrians had been tried and had failed. The Chaldeans and the Yezidis (Devil-worshippers) had proved unsuitable as soldiers. This number was duly enlisted, but the recruits suffered much from the same troubles as did our own New Army in the early days of the war, nor did they endure their troubles so patiently. At the beginning equipment, clothing, and even tents were lacking, and at Dohuk, where they were concentrated, there was much malaria, and most of them went down with fever. There were grumbles at cuts in their pay, for they had been enlisted with the promise of a monthly pay of Rs. 50, and when a 10 percent cut was made from this and they only received Rs. 45 they refused to re-engage when their first year was up. This, as will be seen, was an important factor in the future development of things. Those who refused to re-engage were later persuaded to do so by David, (he had received the O.B.E. for distinguished service during the Batas operations the year before), the father of the Mar Shimun, who later on became Chief Liaison Officer of the Levies. The importance of this is that members of the family of the Mar Shimun thus came to exercise very great authority over the Levies. For a considerable period they controlled enlistments and promotions, and at the present time those Assyrian Levies who remain in the service are the most enthusiastic supporters of the Mar Shimun. Conversely, the influence of the Mar Shimun's family among the Levies has greatly strengthened his own authority among the Assyrians as a whole. It was very convenient for the British authorities when any question arose to deal with the Levies through the Mar Shimun. This was notably the case when the political mutiny of 1932 occurred and, as will be seen later, it had much to do with the Mar Shimun's claim that what he called his temporal power should be recognized.
By October 1922 the Assyrian units in the Levies consisted of two battalions of infantry, one pack battery, and two squadrons of cavalry. During the year they had been employed in operations at Rania, near Suleimaniyah, and at Amadiyah. In Amadiyah town there was a sudden Kurdish rising, inspired partly by Turkish propaganda and partly by a dislike on the part of the Kurdish Aghas of being brought under control, which had nearly resulted in the capture of the Qaimaqam. He was only saved by the prompt arrival of Bishop Sirkis, who, as soon as he heard what was happening, hastily collected two hundred Assyrians and sailed into the fray - another proof that an Assyrian Bishop is as much at home with the rifle as with the pastoral staff. (Another Bishop, Yusef, uncle of the Mar Shimun, was once invited to take part in a sweep at a R.A.F. rifle meeting. He did so and finished seventh out of 150 firers!). Two unfortunate incidents were soon to occur. In August 1923 there was a fracas in the Bazaar at Mosul which nearly caused a serious outbreak. Two Assyrian children were found killed and their murderers were never discovered. The Assyrian Levies, whose headquarters were in Mosul, in their indignation nearly got out of hand, the people at Mosul are always difficult, and there had always been feeling between the Moslems and the Christians in the town. This feeling became bitterer as the result of this incident, and it was most unfortunately followed in May 1924 by a serious affair at Kirkuk, where the 2nd Battalion of Assyrians was stationed and where there was an actual outbreak. As in Mosul, relations between the Assyrians and the townspeople of Kirkuk, mainly of Turkoman origin, were the reverse of friendly. A second battalion was under orders to proceed to Suleimaniyah to join the Iraqi Army in operations against Sheikh Mahmud, the Kurdish National leader, who was engaged in one of his periodic revolts against the Iraqi Government. It was alleged that the townspeople taunted the Levy soldiers with what would happen to their wives and families when they left for the front. Tension ran high and a brawl in a coffee shop caused a riot. The news was carried back to the barracks that an Assyrian soldier had been killed, and this news set the match to the powder barrel. The Assyrians seized their rifles and ran amok throughout the Bazaars of the town, firing on everyone they saw. To start with, their own British officers were unable to check them and for some little time they were out of control and it was only with some difficulty that their officers were able to reassert their authority. Fifty of the townspeople were killed in this affair, among them a much revered religious Sheikh. Four Assyrian soldiers lost their lives. No doubt the provocation was considerable, but, as has been stated in an earlier chapter, whatever the provocation may have been, such an outbreak on the part of disciplined troops was a serious blot on the good name of the Assyrians. Most serious was the effect it had in widening the gulf between the Assyrians and the Iraqis, who by 1933 seemed to be fully persuaded that the Assyrians were invincible - a psychological factor which will be appreciated in a later chapter. When a court-martial at Kirkuk was held only nine Levy soldiers were found guilty. This, too, caused considerable comment in the Iraqi Press, unaccustomed as it was to the justice of a British court-martial. They were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, but the Iraqi Government displayed a very creditable sense of moderation and only a portion of the sentences was actually served.
In the summer of 1924 the Assyrian Levies were again engaged in operations against Sheikh Mahmud. (Actually the Assyrian Levies were engaged in almost continuous operations against Sheikh Mahmud from the summer of 1924 until May 1927. It has always been somewhat of a grievance among them that few of them were awarded the General Service Medal, which the R.A.F. personnel obtained for shorter periods of service). At that time the Iraqi Army was only three years old. Unlike the Assyrians, who had the benefit of the direct command of British officers with experience in dealing with such troops, the Iraqi Army was under the disadvantage of being officered by Arabs, with British officers only in advisory capacities, and these Arabs were either ex-Turkish officers who, however experienced, had found no little difficulty in turning over to British ideas, or young officers whose military schooling was just beginning. The Arab troops too were untried; most of them were plainsmen or men from the deserts and towns. They were entirely out of their element when taken up into Kurdish hills, where conditions of warfare are much the same as on the northwest frontier of India. The terrain is entirely in favor of the defenders. Sheikh Mahmud's men were not only well armed, but they knew every inch of the country. The Iraqi forces were moving through a semi-hostile countryside, and there is no doubt that the Arab troops would have found themselves in serious difficulties if they had not had Levy support. This was true as late as 1932, when the rebellious Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan could never have been reduced by the Iraqis without the help of the British Royal Air Force. The Assyrians, too, sent their 3rd battalion later in 1924 to the Amadiyah district. As already related, the Turks had evicted the Assyrian settlers from the Hakkiari Mountains and had pursued them into Iraqi territory. Here they were repulsed, largely by the Assyrian irregulars who had been hastily collected. The regular Assyrian troops on this occasion displayed the finest discipline under the most trying circumstances. Their families were imperiled from the advancing Turks, but the Levies remained firm. They behaved just as well, as will be described later, under even more trying conditions in August 1933.
Another attempt to employ Assyrian irregulars the next year ended in failure, as the following account shows. The costumes of the men recruited at Mosul indicated how irregular they were. Some of them were dressed in their picturesque native Assyrian clothes, and thence by various stages to European dress complete with grey bowler hat. They were only raised at all by an increase of a promise of pay. They had no idea of discipline on the march or in action. During the action at Kinaru, on June 25th, every man fought for himself bravely enough, but with entire disregard for the rest of the force. When placed on picket near Penjvin, most of them left the picket line and descended to the village to loot. Only on independent patrols did they do really good work, and here they nearly obeyed orders. On this the Colonel Commandant of the force interviewed them and sixty-nine of them agreed to obey orders. These were formed into a mounted body called locally "The 69th Light Horse”. The rest were sent back to Mosul and discharged. It was at this time that the Assyrians suffered their heaviest casualties in action, but these casualties were very slight and must appear trivial as compared with the holocausts reported almost daily during the Great War. And in fact the Assyrians were never tested in the face of heavy losses. This is a point which has sometimes been lost sight of. The Assyrians were at home in the mountains, and they were the equals of the Kurds in the guerrilla warfare on their own grounds. Under these conditions they were infinitely superior to the Arabs of the plains, but it was never put to the test whether their fighting value outside their own terrain (when after the mutiny of 1932 a few of the Assyrian Levies were moved down to Basrah, they were distinctly unhappy in the steamy autumn on the Shatt-al-Arab) would have been greater than that of the Arabs had these two been commanded, by British officers. In the type of warfare, however, in which the Assyrians were engaged and to which they were accustomed, heavy casualties were not likely to occur and they certainly did all that was asked of them. They were enthusiastically praised by their British officers, who, as is the way with British officers all over the world, fostered as much as possible their esprit de corps. Perhaps, however, there was too much belittlement of the young Iraqi Army, which was in the process of formation, and which, as already stated, in its first operations in the mountains was by no means successful. This comment will probably be criticized in certain quarters, but it can hardly be disputed that some of the junior British officers in the Levies were rather prejudiced against the Arab Government. In any case feelings of intense jealously sprang up between the Assyrian Levies and the Iraqi Army, and these feelings increased the mutual dislike of Assyrian and Arab. The Assyrians took their cue from their officers - indeed, from the very fact of their service with the British - in despising the Arabs. The Arabs felt that a subject race was being used as an instrument against them by the Mandatory Power, whose intentions they never imagined were honest. Neither Assyrian nor Arab in those early days of the Mandate thought for one minute that within ten years British control would be gone and the country independent, and the Assyrians' unpopularity from 1932 onwards is largely the result of their service with the British. The services for the British commended them to the whole of the British community, to their own officers, and to the members of the Royal Air Force stationed from time to time in the country. Their appearance, as has been said, was smart and they were, moreover, cheerful under the worst weather conditions, and, as is the way of mountaineers, they could endure extreme hardship. Unlike many native troops they could, and did, produce officers who were fit to command. Those Assyrians who rose to commissioned rank were all men of initiative and efficiency. They had taken readily to British tactical ideas, and, unlike many Eastern peoples, they were not only willing but able to accept responsibilities.
From 1926 onwards the Levies began to be reduced in strength. Those that took their discharge were given a rifle and two hundred rounds of ammunition, the object being that they should be able to protect themselves in their villages. The Arabs have strenuously criticized this on the grounds that it was a British device to establish a pro-British armed enclave in the north of Iraq. When the troubles came in 1932-3 the Arabs still believed that the British were using the Assyrians against the interests of the independent Arab Government in Baghdad, and were both surprised and relieved when they made the discovery that it was British policy to support the Iraqi Government and not the Assyrians. So far as concerned the rifle and two hundred rounds of ammunition, the issue of these was fully justified. Practically every Kurd in the country is armed, and it was only right that every Assyrian should have a rifle as well. It would have been impossible to have sent the Assyrians home to their villages unarmed, for that would have put them at the mercy of the Kurds. Equally impossible was the only alternative, namely the disarmament of the Kurds - even yet the Iraqi Government is not nearly strong enough to effect this.
Some of the discharged Levies joined the Iraqi Police, where they did well, and a few the Army, where not through any fault of their own, they proved less satisfactory. Altogether approximately four thousand Assyrians passed through the Levies. The greatest number serving at any time was about two thousand five hundred. By June 1932 their numbers had been reduced to one thousand five hundred, and a year later to eight hundred, and they were employed solely to guard the British R.A.F. aerodromes as provided in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1931. There had been no active service since 1927, though they had assisted the Iraqi Army in garrisoning various stations, notably Billeh, just at the foot of the Barzan country. Negotiations are now in progress with a view to changing the name of the Levies to that of Air Defense Guards, for which force Arabs and Kurds are also being recruited.
It is easy to be wise after the event, but looking back one may doubt the wisdom of enlisting the Assyrians into the Levies. It is true that in 1921 this was the obvious thing to do. They were clearly good fighting material. They were still unsettled and their levy pay would be a godsend to them. It was still hoped that they would be able to return to their Hakkiari homes where they would enjoy some kind of self-government. But this was not to be. By the end of 1925 it was certain that they had no apparent future except as Iraqi citizens. Therefore, the sooner they could be assimilated in the Iraqi State the better, but being employed as they were as Imperial troops under an unpopular Mandatory Power they seemed definitely alien to the rest of Iraq. Ever since the formation of the Iraqi State the Iraqi politician has been terrified of the minority question, which might postpone the obtaining of the longed for independence. And here there was a minority, if ever there was one. Financially, of course, the Assyrians profited very greatly from their levy service, while the British taxpayer also benefited, since by the employment of Assyrians rather than British or Indian troops in Iraq very considerable economies were affected. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether in the long run the Assyrians have gained. It can hardly be disputed that Great Britain by employing them as Levies has undertaken a real obligation on their behalf. It might have been expected that the Iraqi Government should be grateful to the Assyrian Levies for their service in the early days, they certainly accomplished much good work, unfortunately however, political reasons forbid any display of gratitude.
Every visitor to Baghdad has remarked on the extremely smart appearance of the guards at the houses of the High Commissioner and the Air Officer Commanding. The general appearance of these troops with their slouch hats and red or white hackles was favorably commented upon by all who saw them and their officers from time to time have said that they were as good as any troops in Asia, not excluding the Sikhs and Gurkhas.
The original Levies were not Assyrians at all. No doubt many will be surprised to learn that it was not until 1928 that the Levies became entirely Assyrian. The force subsequently known as the Levies, originated in Muntafiq Horse, a body of Arabs from the Muntafiq province on the lower Euphrates, forty in number, who were enlisted by Major Eadie in 1915. The force expanded rapidly and became known as "Shabanas", a Turkish word meaning a semi-military gendarmerie. As they became more disciplined they rendered excellent service, and during the Arab rebellion of 1920 they displayed, under conditions of the greatest trial, steadfast loyalty to their British officers. At this time practically all the "Shabanas" were Arabs, with a few Kurds in the north.
In 1919 two battalions of Assyrians were formed out of the refugees in Baquba camp. They were, however, quite distinct from the "Shabanas". They were employed in the north and did good work in operations against the Kurds near Amadiyah. They were however disbanded in 1920 to allow them to take part in Agha Petros's enterprise. In 1920 the Assyrians, as has already been related had given proof of their fighting qualities, when the camps at Mindan and Baquba were attacked by the Arab rebels. During this rebellion much of the country was to all intents and purposes out of control. There were a few isolated places where British officers held out and in several instances these officers were murdered by the rebel Arabs. It would not have been surprising therefore if the Assyrian associates of the British had not been similarly dealt with. But in their camps they held out against all attacks - Arabs at Baquba and of Kurds at Mindan - and General Haldane's testimony to the value of their services has already been quoted.
In the year following the rebellion the Cairo Conference was held. This Conference was held in order to decide what Britain was to do with her Arab conquests. Mr. Winston Churchill, who was, at that time, Secretary of State for the Colonies, presided, and there were present all the experts from the old Arab Bureau who had functioned during the war in Cairo and who had been largely instrumental in bringing the Sharifian forces under the Emir Feisal. Of the many decisions taken at this Conference perhaps the most important was that the Emir Feisal, who in the previous year had been ejected from Damascus by the French, should be recommended to the people of Mesopotamia, or Iraq as it was to be called, as their King. It was also decided, that in the interests of economy the British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia should be replaced by local Levies. These were to comprise Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrians and were to be Imperial troops, maintained and paid by the British Treasury. It was, however, not desired that the enlistment of Arabs in the Levies should be continued for long, as otherwise there would be competition with the Iraqi Army which was shortly to be formed.
So in April 1921 came the first attempt to enlist Assyrians and they were far from successful. The Assyrians said that all they wanted was that the British should arrange for them to return to their own homes. Within two or three months however, two hundred had joined largely through the persuasive eloquence of Dr. Wigram, who having for some years before the war served in the Hakkiari Mountains with the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission was well known to them. The Command was given to Brigadier-General Sadleir Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. More Assyrians joined later and the Assyrian Levies as such had their baptism of fire in December 1921 in the operations near Batas and Harir near Rowanduz, which was at that time in the occupation of the Turks. There was not much actual fighting but the cheerful manner in which the Assyrians underwent extremely trying climatic conditions earned the wholehearted praise of their British officers.
In 1922 it was decided to recruit 1,500 more Assyrians. The experiment of having mixed companies of Kurds and Assyrians had been tried and had failed. The Chaldeans and the Yezidis (Devil-worshippers) had proved unsuitable as soldiers. This number was duly enlisted, but the recruits suffered much from the same troubles as did our own New Army in the early days of the war, nor did they endure their troubles so patiently. At the beginning equipment, clothing, and even tents were lacking, and at Dohuk, where they were concentrated, there was much malaria, and most of them went down with fever. There were grumbles at cuts in their pay, for they had been enlisted with the promise of a monthly pay of Rs. 50, and when a 10 percent cut was made from this and they only received Rs. 45 they refused to re-engage when their first year was up. This, as will be seen, was an important factor in the future development of things. Those who refused to re-engage were later persuaded to do so by David, (he had received the O.B.E. for distinguished service during the Batas operations the year before), the father of the Mar Shimun, who later on became Chief Liaison Officer of the Levies. The importance of this is that members of the family of the Mar Shimun thus came to exercise very great authority over the Levies. For a considerable period they controlled enlistments and promotions, and at the present time those Assyrian Levies who remain in the service are the most enthusiastic supporters of the Mar Shimun. Conversely, the influence of the Mar Shimun's family among the Levies has greatly strengthened his own authority among the Assyrians as a whole. It was very convenient for the British authorities when any question arose to deal with the Levies through the Mar Shimun. This was notably the case when the political mutiny of 1932 occurred and, as will be seen later, it had much to do with the Mar Shimun's claim that what he called his temporal power should be recognized.
By October 1922 the Assyrian units in the Levies consisted of two battalions of infantry, one pack battery, and two squadrons of cavalry. During the year they had been employed in operations at Rania, near Suleimaniyah, and at Amadiyah. In Amadiyah town there was a sudden Kurdish rising, inspired partly by Turkish propaganda and partly by a dislike on the part of the Kurdish Aghas of being brought under control, which had nearly resulted in the capture of the Qaimaqam. He was only saved by the prompt arrival of Bishop Sirkis, who, as soon as he heard what was happening, hastily collected two hundred Assyrians and sailed into the fray - another proof that an Assyrian Bishop is as much at home with the rifle as with the pastoral staff. (Another Bishop, Yusef, uncle of the Mar Shimun, was once invited to take part in a sweep at a R.A.F. rifle meeting. He did so and finished seventh out of 150 firers!). Two unfortunate incidents were soon to occur. In August 1923 there was a fracas in the Bazaar at Mosul which nearly caused a serious outbreak. Two Assyrian children were found killed and their murderers were never discovered. The Assyrian Levies, whose headquarters were in Mosul, in their indignation nearly got out of hand, the people at Mosul are always difficult, and there had always been feeling between the Moslems and the Christians in the town. This feeling became bitterer as the result of this incident, and it was most unfortunately followed in May 1924 by a serious affair at Kirkuk, where the 2nd Battalion of Assyrians was stationed and where there was an actual outbreak. As in Mosul, relations between the Assyrians and the townspeople of Kirkuk, mainly of Turkoman origin, were the reverse of friendly. A second battalion was under orders to proceed to Suleimaniyah to join the Iraqi Army in operations against Sheikh Mahmud, the Kurdish National leader, who was engaged in one of his periodic revolts against the Iraqi Government. It was alleged that the townspeople taunted the Levy soldiers with what would happen to their wives and families when they left for the front. Tension ran high and a brawl in a coffee shop caused a riot. The news was carried back to the barracks that an Assyrian soldier had been killed, and this news set the match to the powder barrel. The Assyrians seized their rifles and ran amok throughout the Bazaars of the town, firing on everyone they saw. To start with, their own British officers were unable to check them and for some little time they were out of control and it was only with some difficulty that their officers were able to reassert their authority. Fifty of the townspeople were killed in this affair, among them a much revered religious Sheikh. Four Assyrian soldiers lost their lives. No doubt the provocation was considerable, but, as has been stated in an earlier chapter, whatever the provocation may have been, such an outbreak on the part of disciplined troops was a serious blot on the good name of the Assyrians. Most serious was the effect it had in widening the gulf between the Assyrians and the Iraqis, who by 1933 seemed to be fully persuaded that the Assyrians were invincible - a psychological factor which will be appreciated in a later chapter. When a court-martial at Kirkuk was held only nine Levy soldiers were found guilty. This, too, caused considerable comment in the Iraqi Press, unaccustomed as it was to the justice of a British court-martial. They were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, but the Iraqi Government displayed a very creditable sense of moderation and only a portion of the sentences was actually served.
In the summer of 1924 the Assyrian Levies were again engaged in operations against Sheikh Mahmud. (Actually the Assyrian Levies were engaged in almost continuous operations against Sheikh Mahmud from the summer of 1924 until May 1927. It has always been somewhat of a grievance among them that few of them were awarded the General Service Medal, which the R.A.F. personnel obtained for shorter periods of service). At that time the Iraqi Army was only three years old. Unlike the Assyrians, who had the benefit of the direct command of British officers with experience in dealing with such troops, the Iraqi Army was under the disadvantage of being officered by Arabs, with British officers only in advisory capacities, and these Arabs were either ex-Turkish officers who, however experienced, had found no little difficulty in turning over to British ideas, or young officers whose military schooling was just beginning. The Arab troops too were untried; most of them were plainsmen or men from the deserts and towns. They were entirely out of their element when taken up into Kurdish hills, where conditions of warfare are much the same as on the northwest frontier of India. The terrain is entirely in favor of the defenders. Sheikh Mahmud's men were not only well armed, but they knew every inch of the country. The Iraqi forces were moving through a semi-hostile countryside, and there is no doubt that the Arab troops would have found themselves in serious difficulties if they had not had Levy support. This was true as late as 1932, when the rebellious Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan could never have been reduced by the Iraqis without the help of the British Royal Air Force. The Assyrians, too, sent their 3rd battalion later in 1924 to the Amadiyah district. As already related, the Turks had evicted the Assyrian settlers from the Hakkiari Mountains and had pursued them into Iraqi territory. Here they were repulsed, largely by the Assyrian irregulars who had been hastily collected. The regular Assyrian troops on this occasion displayed the finest discipline under the most trying circumstances. Their families were imperiled from the advancing Turks, but the Levies remained firm. They behaved just as well, as will be described later, under even more trying conditions in August 1933.
Another attempt to employ Assyrian irregulars the next year ended in failure, as the following account shows. The costumes of the men recruited at Mosul indicated how irregular they were. Some of them were dressed in their picturesque native Assyrian clothes, and thence by various stages to European dress complete with grey bowler hat. They were only raised at all by an increase of a promise of pay. They had no idea of discipline on the march or in action. During the action at Kinaru, on June 25th, every man fought for himself bravely enough, but with entire disregard for the rest of the force. When placed on picket near Penjvin, most of them left the picket line and descended to the village to loot. Only on independent patrols did they do really good work, and here they nearly obeyed orders. On this the Colonel Commandant of the force interviewed them and sixty-nine of them agreed to obey orders. These were formed into a mounted body called locally "The 69th Light Horse”. The rest were sent back to Mosul and discharged. It was at this time that the Assyrians suffered their heaviest casualties in action, but these casualties were very slight and must appear trivial as compared with the holocausts reported almost daily during the Great War. And in fact the Assyrians were never tested in the face of heavy losses. This is a point which has sometimes been lost sight of. The Assyrians were at home in the mountains, and they were the equals of the Kurds in the guerrilla warfare on their own grounds. Under these conditions they were infinitely superior to the Arabs of the plains, but it was never put to the test whether their fighting value outside their own terrain (when after the mutiny of 1932 a few of the Assyrian Levies were moved down to Basrah, they were distinctly unhappy in the steamy autumn on the Shatt-al-Arab) would have been greater than that of the Arabs had these two been commanded, by British officers. In the type of warfare, however, in which the Assyrians were engaged and to which they were accustomed, heavy casualties were not likely to occur and they certainly did all that was asked of them. They were enthusiastically praised by their British officers, who, as is the way with British officers all over the world, fostered as much as possible their esprit de corps. Perhaps, however, there was too much belittlement of the young Iraqi Army, which was in the process of formation, and which, as already stated, in its first operations in the mountains was by no means successful. This comment will probably be criticized in certain quarters, but it can hardly be disputed that some of the junior British officers in the Levies were rather prejudiced against the Arab Government. In any case feelings of intense jealously sprang up between the Assyrian Levies and the Iraqi Army, and these feelings increased the mutual dislike of Assyrian and Arab. The Assyrians took their cue from their officers - indeed, from the very fact of their service with the British - in despising the Arabs. The Arabs felt that a subject race was being used as an instrument against them by the Mandatory Power, whose intentions they never imagined were honest. Neither Assyrian nor Arab in those early days of the Mandate thought for one minute that within ten years British control would be gone and the country independent, and the Assyrians' unpopularity from 1932 onwards is largely the result of their service with the British. The services for the British commended them to the whole of the British community, to their own officers, and to the members of the Royal Air Force stationed from time to time in the country. Their appearance, as has been said, was smart and they were, moreover, cheerful under the worst weather conditions, and, as is the way of mountaineers, they could endure extreme hardship. Unlike many native troops they could, and did, produce officers who were fit to command. Those Assyrians who rose to commissioned rank were all men of initiative and efficiency. They had taken readily to British tactical ideas, and, unlike many Eastern peoples, they were not only willing but able to accept responsibilities.
From 1926 onwards the Levies began to be reduced in strength. Those that took their discharge were given a rifle and two hundred rounds of ammunition, the object being that they should be able to protect themselves in their villages. The Arabs have strenuously criticized this on the grounds that it was a British device to establish a pro-British armed enclave in the north of Iraq. When the troubles came in 1932-3 the Arabs still believed that the British were using the Assyrians against the interests of the independent Arab Government in Baghdad, and were both surprised and relieved when they made the discovery that it was British policy to support the Iraqi Government and not the Assyrians. So far as concerned the rifle and two hundred rounds of ammunition, the issue of these was fully justified. Practically every Kurd in the country is armed, and it was only right that every Assyrian should have a rifle as well. It would have been impossible to have sent the Assyrians home to their villages unarmed, for that would have put them at the mercy of the Kurds. Equally impossible was the only alternative, namely the disarmament of the Kurds - even yet the Iraqi Government is not nearly strong enough to effect this.
Some of the discharged Levies joined the Iraqi Police, where they did well, and a few the Army, where not through any fault of their own, they proved less satisfactory. Altogether approximately four thousand Assyrians passed through the Levies. The greatest number serving at any time was about two thousand five hundred. By June 1932 their numbers had been reduced to one thousand five hundred, and a year later to eight hundred, and they were employed solely to guard the British R.A.F. aerodromes as provided in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1931. There had been no active service since 1927, though they had assisted the Iraqi Army in garrisoning various stations, notably Billeh, just at the foot of the Barzan country. Negotiations are now in progress with a view to changing the name of the Levies to that of Air Defense Guards, for which force Arabs and Kurds are also being recruited.
It is easy to be wise after the event, but looking back one may doubt the wisdom of enlisting the Assyrians into the Levies. It is true that in 1921 this was the obvious thing to do. They were clearly good fighting material. They were still unsettled and their levy pay would be a godsend to them. It was still hoped that they would be able to return to their Hakkiari homes where they would enjoy some kind of self-government. But this was not to be. By the end of 1925 it was certain that they had no apparent future except as Iraqi citizens. Therefore, the sooner they could be assimilated in the Iraqi State the better, but being employed as they were as Imperial troops under an unpopular Mandatory Power they seemed definitely alien to the rest of Iraq. Ever since the formation of the Iraqi State the Iraqi politician has been terrified of the minority question, which might postpone the obtaining of the longed for independence. And here there was a minority, if ever there was one. Financially, of course, the Assyrians profited very greatly from their levy service, while the British taxpayer also benefited, since by the employment of Assyrians rather than British or Indian troops in Iraq very considerable economies were affected. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether in the long run the Assyrians have gained. It can hardly be disputed that Great Britain by employing them as Levies has undertaken a real obligation on their behalf. It might have been expected that the Iraqi Government should be grateful to the Assyrian Levies for their service in the early days, they certainly accomplished much good work, unfortunately however, political reasons forbid any display of gratitude.